What Was the Turning Point of World War II?China Migration 4: Emigration
Migration from China.
Journal of International Affairs, Winter96,
Vol. 49 Issue 2, p434, 22p, 2 charts
Author(s):
Skeldon, Ronald
Focuses on migration in China.
B P Localization and control of
P Destinations open to ethnic
C S Return movements of
students and settlers.
MIGRATION FROM CHINA
Tradition holds that the Chinese were a non-migratory people:
Generally speaking, no Chinese will leave his home to seek
his fortune at a distance unless he is in some way driven to do so . . . No
Chinese leaves his home not intending to return. His hope is
always to come back rich, to die and be buried where his ancestors are
buried.[1]
Yet, the reality was different. Southward expansion is one of the great
themes of Chinese. history as the Han, over the centuries,
progressively colonized beyond the Yangzi [2] Warfare and famine led to complex
patterns of expulsion and flight. In times of peace and prosperity, thousands
moved to towns, as sojourners perhaps, with the intention of returning, but
spending most of their lives away from their homes. The inhabitants of Southern
China had broader horizons, as Sterling Seagrave has shown in a recent, somewhat
swashbuckling book, and they established trading diasporas throughout what is
now Southeast Asia and beyond into the Indian Ocean.[3] The Northern
Chinese, on the other hand, rarely looked beyond the bounds of the
Middle Kingdom -- until recently, when their leaders realized that if China was
to regain the position it had held as the world's largest economy for so much of
human history, it must come to some kind of accommodation with the increasingly
interdependent global community.
Population migration is very much part of that accommodation as
it is a clear physical link between China and the international economy. The
recent evolution of movements, not just from China but also from the peripheral
areas of Hong Kong and Taiwan, which make up what can be called Greater China,"
will be considered in this article. A major theme is that the recent patterns
cannot be understood without some appreciation of past migration.
While there are significant differences between present movement from China and
past migrations, there are also important continuities, and these
can best be appreciated within an evolutionary framework.
Three very broad periods are identified in the recent history of China. The
first is the hundred years from the middle of the nineteenth century to the
foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949. The middle of the
nineteenth century is but an approximate time to start our considerations. Hong
Kong was established as a British colony in 1841 and emigration began almost
immediately thereafter.[4] The year 1860, however, is perhaps a more appropriate
beginning point as in that year the late Qing restrictions on emigration were
lifted and the Chinese accepted that their nationals had the right
to go overseas.[]5 Although migration from China had occurred
before the mid-nineteenth century and trade was sponsored during the Ming
dynasty, emigration was never officially encouraged and there were periods under
the Qing when it was banned totally and returned migrants might pay with their
lives.[6] The period from the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of
the twentieth century was one of pronounced, if fluctuating, emigration to
various destinations dominated by males who saw themselves going overseas
temporarily While there were those who settled permanently this period, for a
variety- of reasons, was dominated by sojourners.
The second period covers the socialist economy of Mao Zedong and his
immediate successors from the formation of the People's Republic in 1949 to the
end of 1978. This was a period during which, as before 1850, there were times
when migration in general was tightly controlled by the state and
emigration was essentially prohibited.
In December 1978, at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of
the Chinese Communist Party, China shifted direction toward a more
open economy through the road to "socialist modernization." Formal diplomatic
links with the United States were established from 1 January 1979, formally
representing the linking of China to the outside world. This third period, from
the beginning of 1979, saw migration increase in volume, not to
levels seen during the first period perhaps, but in terms of complexity and in
the types of migrants involved. This article will focus primarily on this
increasing complexity since 1979, but will first consider briefly the earlier
periods to provide an essential backdrop against which more recent movements can
be viewed.
The Emigration between 1850 and 1949
Although the Chinese have been moving for centuries, it was
only in the nineteenth century that the diaspora began in earnest. Discoveries
of gold in the mountains of the Western United States from 1848, in Southern
Australia from 1851, and in Western Canada from 1858 set in motion a flow of
people from China that, over the next eight decades, would include millions of
individuals. The vast majority of migrants were never involved in gold-mining
and never reached the more distant destinations, but those returning in the
earliest periods were instrumental in spreading information about a world beyond
the confines of Chinese towns and villages. Some left China as
free migrants, paying their own way. Many more left as indentured or contract
laborers enlisted directly by governments or by labor recruiters. Yet others
left on the "credit-ticket" system where their expenses were advanced to them
and they were expected to gay off their debts after reaching their
destination.[7] The vast majority of the migrants were males who expected to
return home to their families or to marry after their time overseas. They were
the sojourners, and the fact that many died outside of China or became trapped
through indebtedness or inertia does not deny the essentially circular nature of
this migration system.[8] However, Chinese did
settle overseas, particularly where women also migrated, or were allowed to.
Hence, large and fairly stable overseas communities had been established before
the outbreak of the Second World War with between 8.5 and 9 million
Chinese outside of China, the vast majority of whom were in
Southeast Asia, or the Nanyang.[9] The network was, however, much more
extensive, with communities established throughout Spanish America, the
Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, South Africa, North America and Australasia.
This emigration from China was highly localized and controlled through those
parts of China annexed as colonies: Hong Kong, Macau and the "treaty ports,"
that is, the ports from which foreign merchants were allowed to trade. HongKong
and Macau, on either side of the Pearl River Delta in South Central Guangdong
Province, and Amoy and Shantou (Swatow) in Eastern Guangdong were the principal
ports. In the hinterlands, the origins of the migrants were yet more localized.
The movements to North America were almost entirely from four districts in the
Western Pearl River Delta and mainly from one of these districts, Taishan
(Toishan). Origins in Eastern Guangdong and Fujian were equally localized and
the limited number of surnames among the overseas Chinese has been
observed, reflecting the dominance of a small number of lineages and villages in
the process.[10] The migration demonstrates a classic chain effect
based upon areas of quite limited extent.
It has been estimated that, between the 1850s and 1939, over six million
people moved from Hong Kong alone. Some individuals however, would have made
several overseas trips in their lifetimes. [11] In the 1850s, the vast majority
moved to North America and Australia while, from the 1870s onwards, Singapore
and the Malay states emerged as the principal destinations. This switch in
destination was brought about by two concurrent processes. First, the "great
white walls" of the exclusion policies were progressively erected around the
United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand-- policies specifically
designed to keep Asians out.[12] Second, the colonial governments in Southeast
Asia, primarily the British, were seeking labor to develop the economies of
territories they were rapidly absorbing.
By the turn of the century, over 100,000 people a year were leaving both Hong
Kong and Amoy for the Nanyang. The vast majority were almost certainly poor
peasants from villages and small towns in Southern China who left to become
laborers in both rural and urban activities, but migrants also included free
settlers. They left an impoverished Southern China to work tin and develop
market gardening in the Malay peninsula, to open up tobacco and rubber
plantations in Sumatra and Sarawak respectively and to become rickshaw pullers
and prostitutes in Singapore.[13] Also, a minority who had considerable urban
experience, and some education and capital moved to extend trade and
entrepreneurial activities. Perhaps of greatest significance, however, was that
the destination areas provided opportunities for poorer migrants to become
successful through hard work and personal contacts. There was thus considerable
scope for economic and social mobility, resulting in a much greater range of
Chinese migrants in terms of background and activities.
By the 1930S, with the recession in the capitalist world, Southeast Asian
destinations were becoming restricted to further Chinese
immigration. This was followed by 12 years of disruption caused by
the Sino-Japanese War, the Second World War, and the civil war between the
Communist and Kuomintang armies. This period culminated with mass exoduses of
two to three million people to Hong Kong and Taiwan upon the triumph of the
Communist party in 1949. China subsequently isolated itself from the capitalist
world and relatively few were able to leave. The great phase of
migration that had formed the basis of a global network of
overseas Chinese was over. That basis is fundamental for any
analyses of current migration as, since the mid-1960s,
Chinese have progressively been drawn into a new phase of
emigration which clearly builds upon the global network established by earlier
migrations.
Emigration between 1950 and 1978
The period from 1950 to 1978 can be seen as one of restricted or controlled
migration from China itself, but one of gradually increasing
movements from the "peripheral" areas of' Hong Kong and Taiwan. It is necessary
to consider these two areas in any discussion of migration from
China as the majority of those who left these areas had been born in China
itself, having been part of the exodus of the late 1940s. Any distinction
between China and Hong Kong or Taiwan thus becomes blurred, with the
migration fields of the three areas being inextricably linked.
The main flow out of China during this period was to Hong Kong with around
40,000 persons a year entering the British colony during the 1950s. This figure
dropped to 10,000 during the 1960s, except during the chaotic conditions in 1962
following the great famine when over 120,000 entered Hong Kong in over a
six-week period, over half of whom were arrested and deported.[14]
Rustification, or the "sending down" of urban dwellers to rural areas, was
prominent in the early 1960s as China placed its development priority on the
agricultural regions. This turning in wards of migration was
intensified from 1966 with the onset to the Cul-rural Revolution when movement
overseas was prohibited in a way reminiscent of much earlier Qing policies.
Excluding migrations to Hong Kong, movements from China during
this period tended to be restricted to socialist bloc countries with, for
example, more than 11,000 Chinese students and scholars being sent
to the Soviet Union to study in the 1950s and over 13,000 engineers, technicians
and support staff being sent to Tanzania to assist with railway construction in
the early 1970s.
There were few destinations open to ethnic Chinese peoples in
the 1950s, either for settlement or for work. One of these was the United
Kingdom which, until 1962, allowed virtual free access to Commonwealth citizens
to settle. Because villagers of the New Territories of Hong Kong were able to
prove unequivocally that they had been born on what the British considered their
territory, there developed a migration flow of rice farmers to set
up Chinese restaurants throughout the United Kingdom. However,
this migration slowed with progressive restrictions on immigrants
into Britain from 1962 following a wave of immigration from new
Commonwealth countries.
Meanwhile, major changes to the immigration policies of the
countries of traditional European settlement in North America and Australasia
were taking place from the mid-1960s. Although the infamous exclusion acts of
the United States had been abolished from the end of the Second World War, no
significant impact on immigration flows was felt until after
implementation of the 1965 Immigration Act, which effectively
removed all discriminatory quotas. Slightly earlier, in January 1962, Canada
introduced revised immigration regulations that effectively
terminated the White Canada policy, and Australia some 10 years later ended its
own white immigration policies. Thus, over the decade beginning in
the early 1960s, the three major countries of immigration
radically adjusted their policies. This factor has been important in shifting
the global migration system from one with origins in Europe to one
with origins in Asia and Latin America. Migration from Asian
countries accounted for only 7.8, 5.5 and 4.0 percent of the
immigration in the early 1960s to the United States, Canada and
Australia respectively By the early 1990s, these proportions had increased to
around 38, 50 and 40 percent respectively. This shift in the nature of the
global migration system preceded but has reinforced the
transformation that has occurred in the Chinese economy and
society since December 1978. As China has opened to the outside world with its
reform program, it has also been able to participate in a very different
international context for transnational population mobility.
Emigration since 1979
The momentous decisions taken in December 1978 to open the
Chinese economy to the outside world implicitly and explicitly
increased contact with foreigners, and thus migration. It is
impossible to place any precise date after which population movements began to
increase into and out of China. For example, Lynn White argues that the ability
of the state to control internal population mobility was being eroded in the
Shanghai region from as early as 1973. The implementation of the reforms from
1979 forms a more convenient date with the evolution of free markets and the
accumulation of personal wealth, allowing more people greater freedom to move.
Official recognition of the increasing migration did not come,
however, until much later and in 1985 two significant developments occurred.
First, in September of that year, the People s Congress enacted the issuing of
identity cards to all residents of China, which meant that it became much easier
for people to move around. Instead of having to obtain permission from their
work unit and from other local authorities, people could now move and obtain
employment simply by using their identity card. Second, in November 1985 the
Emigration and Immigration Law was adopted which guaranteed the
rights of China's citizens to travel outside China and allowed those who wished
to leave the country for private reasons to do so.
The implementation of these laws, however, did not mean that there was
complete freedom of movement. From a practical point of view, there are
significant blockages in transport infrastructure that can make travel within,
to and from China difficult at the best of times. More important, it is still a
long and complex job to obtain a passport. Permission has to be sought from a
variety of sources including current employer, foreign employer or overseas
educational institution, and clearance has to be obtained from the Public
Security Bureau. It is a procedure that may not be entirely free from abuse, and
personal contact (guanxi) is not an insignificant element in charting a course
through the bureaucracy. Excluding diplomatic passports, there are two main
types of Chinese passport. The passport for public uses (yin gong)
is granted to businessmen and students and is valid for either two or five
years. The passport for private uses (yin si) is granted to those accompanying
spouses or joining relatives overseas and is valid for five years. Also, travel
permits and entry and exit passes are granted which can be used for movement to
Hong Kong for business, pleasure or settlement.
The migrations since 1979 have been increasing in volume, but
also in complexity It is thus useful to subdivide the migrants into various
types, even if no single typology in the social sciences can ever produce
watertight divisions. The recent population migration from China
can be divided into four major, if not entirely mutually exclusive, types:
settlers, students, contract laborers and illegal migrants. These four types
will be examined below with emphasis given to settlers and to students although,
for reasons that will become clear, these two types need to be combined for some
parts of the discussion.
Settler Migrants
The Chinese have been an important participant in these new
flows and the numbers of immigrants to the main settlement countries are shown
in table 1. The data cover only part, although the largest part, of ethnic
Chinese migration. Much of the
migration from Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam in particular has
been made up of ethnic Chinese. The focus in this article is on
the migration out of China itself rather than on ethnic
Chinese migration but, as stressed above, Hong Kong
and Taiwan cannot be excluded from the discussion. It is clear that there has
been a marked increase in migration from China to the United
States and Canada from the early 1980s to the early 1990s. Some 57,761 people
from China entered the United States during fiscal year 1992 to 1993 alone
compared with just under 80,000 for the five year period 1982 to 1987. The
longer and more established flows from Hong Kong and Taiwan show a more steady
flow to the United States, although in both cases there had been a marked
increase in movement to Canada and Australia over the same period. With the
notable exception of migration from Hong Kong and China to Canada
(for which there has been a considerable backlog in applications), there was a
slowdown in migration during the most recent year for which there
are available data, 1993 to 1994 over 1992 to 1993. This was partially due to
exceptional circumstances in the migration from China to the
United States during 1992 to 1993, discussed below, and partly due to the
recession in the developed economies, particularly in Australia. A significant,
if gradually declining, proportion of migrants leaving Hong Kong and Taiwan have
been those who were born in China. This emphasizes the difficulty of attempting
to separate a Hong Kong or Taiwan migration from that of China or,
conversely, of excluding Hong Kong or Taiwan from any consideration of
emigration from China. Around 70 percent of the 75,000 who entered the United
States from Hong Kong during the decade of the 1960s had been born in China. By
the early 1990s, this proportion has virtually reversed, with 62 to 65 percent
of those admitted from Hong Kong being born in Hong Kong itself. Although data
on migration from Taiwan and China were not recorded separately
until 1982, we can be fairly certain that the vast majority of the 9,657
recorded as moving from China during the 1950s and the 34,764 moving during the
1960s were from Taiwan. How many of these had been born in China remains
unknown. By 1982, about 82 percent of those admitted to the United States from
Taiwan had been born in Taiwan, while this proportion had further increased to
about 91 percent by 1993. A somewhat similar picture can be observed for the
migration to Canada. For example, in the mid-1970s, around 60
percent of those admitted from Hong Kong had been born there while, by the early
1990s, this proportion had increased to over 70 percent. This pattern is what
one would expect as the effects of the waves of migration from
mainland China of the late 1940s have begun to fade, especially in the case of
Taiwan, where there has been little population interaction with China since
Migration from China to Hong Kong has continued right through
to the present. There was a significant wave of movement in the late 1970s, with
the net addition of some 400,000 from China between calendar years 1976 and 1981
and the continued intake of around 27,000 every year during the 1980s. The
latter figure was based upon an informal agreement between Hong Kong and
Chinese authorities to limit the migration to 75 a
day.[15] This was an attempt, which was largely successful, to control illegal
migration from China. All those leaving must have permission from
all others are considered to be
illegal immigrants and when caught in Hong Kong are repatriated. These migrants
are primarily dependants of Hong Kong residents (wives and children), and their
numbers have been steadily in, creased to 150 a day over the last two years to
avoid a sudden influx once Hong Kong becomes part of China from 1 July 1997.
This population flow of settlers has been the largest legal flow from China to a
single destination. The actual number of immigrants from China admitted to the
United States during fiscal year 1993 was larger than the flow to Hong Kong but
that, as will be seen below, was an exceptional year for very specific reasons.
The data thus suggest that there has been substantial step
migration from China to overseas destinations through Taiwan and
Hong Kong, which has continued through to the present in the case of Hong Kong.
That is, many of those who left China in the late 1940s for Taiwan and Hong Kong
were among the first to move to North America and Australasia once
immigration restrictions were removed. Unfortunately, the
available data on immigration to the major destination countries
do not allow us to disaggregate the flows from either Taiwan or Hong Kong on the
basis of place of birth. Hence, we do not know if the characteristics of the
China-born are in any way different from those of the Hong Kong-born or the
Taiwan-born. Given that the majority of step movers have almost certainly spent
considerable time in either Hong Kong or Taiwan and that Hong Kong's population
in particular has been largely a creation of migration from China,
any distinction based simply upon place of birth is likely to be spurious.
Emigrants from China are also likely to figure among the well-educated and
wealthy who make up so much of the emigrant flows from both Hong Kong and
Taiwan. Not that these migrants are necessarily extremely rich, they are not,
but the flows out of Hong Kong are heavily biased towards well-educated
professionals -- the middle classes -- and migrants from Hong Kong and Taiwan
have together dominated the business migration programs of
Australia, Canada and New Zealand.[16]
Turning to direct emigration from China itself, we have already seen that
family dependants make up the major part of the migration to Hong
Kong. So, too, does family reunification make up a substantial part, probably
the greater part, of the movement to the other major destinations. For example,
in 1992, of the 10,429 immigrants from China admitted into Canada, 6,477 came
under the family class and an additional 512 as "assisted relatives."[17] Up to
fiscal year 1992, most of the immigrants admitted to the United States came
under family-sponsored preferences or as immediate relatives of U.S. citizens.
However, there are exceptions to this pattern. In calendar year 1991 in Canada,
and fiscal years 1993 and 1994 in the United States, there were substantial
numbers of independent migrants and those coming under employment-based
preferences respectively. The latter for the United States accounted for 37,131
of the 57,775 immigrants admitted from China in 1993 and 31,913 of the 47,964
admitted in 1994. Rather than indicating surges of an independent
migration of professionals or skilled migrants directly from
China, these figures indicate the granting of immigrant status to students who
were in these countries around the time of the massacre in Tiananmen Square. In
the United States, the Students Protection Act of 1992 allowed thousands of
students who had been living in the country continuously to adjust to permanent
status. Canada and Australia made similar provisions. Hence, the distinction
between the settlers and the student migration system in the case
of movement from China is somewhat artificial.
Student Migrants
The sending abroad of students for training is one important way to
facilitate the transfer of technology. Sometimes, the ideas learned have much
greater consequences than anticipated and returning students can have a profound
impact on their home societies. For example, many of the early revolutionary
leaders of China, including Sun Yatsen (a student in Hong Kong and in Hawaii);
Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping (both students in Paris) absorbed revolutionary
ideas in destination areas. A more recent generation of students was trained in
the Soviet Union but, as the settler migration system has changed,
so too has the student system. There were very few students from China in the
United States in 1978; only 28 were recorded at American universities.[18] By
the early 1990s, China was the leading source of foreign students in the United
States, with some 44,360, or 10 percent, of all foreign students there in 1993
to 1994. This was clearly the result of China s open door policy "to promote
international exchange." [19] Hong Kong and Taiwan, whose history of sending
large numbers of students to the United States goes back several decades,
together added over 51,000 more students to the U.S. in 1993 to 1994. China has
also emerged as a leading source of students to Canada and Australia, with
between four and five thousand sent to both countries in 1992 and 1994, although
these amounts are far below the numbers of students from Hong Kong to those
destinations. However, the definition of what constitutes a student differs
among the three destination countries. If we limit the analyses to the highest
levels of tertiary education, we find that China is a leading source of
postgraduate students. Students from Hong Kong are often found at more junior
levels, including high school. In the early 1990s, there were also over 12,500
students from China at postsecondary institutions in Japan.
Return Movements of Students and Settlers
The essential question, primarily concerning students but also to some extent
settlers, is the extent to which they will return to China. The experience of
student migration from other East Asian countries indicates that
the proportion of returnees tends to increase over time.[20] Very large numbers
in the governments of Taiwan and Korea have been trained overseas and the trends
towards more democratic systems and increasing rates of return
migration are not simply coincidental. So far, according to
official Chinese sources, only about one third of the 220,000
students from China who have gone overseas since 1979 have returned, and the
proportion returning from the United States is only about one fifth.[21] China,
ideally, wanted all the students to return versed in the ways of foreign
technology, so that they could contribute to economic development and nation
building. There are, however, differences between ideal plans and practical
results. If students currently overseas return to China in substantial numbers,
they may generate changes as radical as those wrought by their revolutionary
predecessors.[22] This scenario is but one possible future consequence of this
migration. For the moment, all we can say is that thousands have
opted to become permanent residents of developed countries, but this need not
necessarily imply permanent exile: The rate of return will depend upon
directions taken in post-Deng China.
It is not only students who return. Movements back home have been an integral
part of all settler migration systems, blurring any clear
distinction between settlers and sojourners in European as well as Asian
migration. However, interesting patterns are evolving among
wealthy Chinese migrants to North America and Australasia, known
as the "astronaut" syndrome and the "parachute kid" syndrome. In the former, a
migrant, usually male, will leave his spouse and family at a destination while
he returns to Hong Kong or Taiwan to continue his business. In the latter, both
parents return to their place of origin after establishing their children with
relatives or, if the children are old enough, on their own in their house in
North America or Australia. Thus, families are established over long distances,
incorporating at least two residences, sometimes more, with one or both parents
commuting at regular intervals from one home to the other. The number of people
participating in such trans-Pacific networks is not insignificant. Furthermore,
the strongly female-biased cohorts in the 35 to 49 year-old age group observed
among the Hong Kong-born in cities in Canada, Australia and New Zealand signify
large numbers of female-headed "astronaut" households.[23] There are no data to
indicate that migrants from China itself, as opposed to those who have been
resident in Hong Kong and Taiwan, are engaging in this process. What is clear
however, is that many of those who go back have done so to take advantage of the
opening-up of the Chinese economy and have business links there.
Thus, Chinese communities in Hong Kong, Taiwan, North America,
Australasia and China itself are linked through these circuits of human
Origins of Settler and Student Migration in China
There are few data on place of origin of the migrants who leave China.
However, given the importance of the flow to Hong Kong and of the family
reunification that has played such an important part in the movement from China
thus far, it would seem reasonable to assume that most of the emigration has
come from the traditional areas of out migration, that is, from
around the Pearl River Delta, from Eastern Guangdong and from coastal parts of
Fujian province. However, the importance of students in the overall movement
from China also suggests that the areas of origin may be broadening. The premier
universities in the country are in Beijing and Shanghai, as well as in
Guangzhou, and it would seem logical that many of the students going overseas
are from these parts of the country The Shanghai region was, in fact, a major
source of students going overseas from pre-communist China.[24]
One study of all recent emigration from China has suggested that over one
quarter of those leaving originated in Shanghai, followed in importance by
Beijing, Fujian and Guangdong? These results were drawn from the number recorded
in the 1990 population census whose permanent household registration system had
been suspended because they were abroad at the time of the census. The total
number of those falling into this category was 237,024, but whether this
included students who might be away temporarily or whole families who might have
moved to Hong Kong, for example, is not clear. What does seem clear is that the
emigration fields have been extended northwards to the large cities of Shanghai
and Beijing and that the students may be in the vanguard of this movement, which
in the future may lead to family reunification from areas far beyond the
traditional southern sources of emigration.
Destinations of Settlers and Students
The most important destinations for the legal migration of
settlers and students are clearly in North America and Australasia.
Migration from Hong Kong has been focused more on Canada, and more
recently Australia, while that from China and Taiwan is more focused on the
United States, even if the movements to the other countries are also important.
For settlers, the specific destinations within these areas are highly focused on
the major cities of each country: to Toronto and Vancouver in C to New
York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and also Seattle in the United S to
Sydney in A and to Auckland in New Zealand. Over 70 percent of Hong
Kong immigrants to Canada have gone to either Ontario (43 percent in 1993) or
British Columbia (31 percent in 1993); 71 percent of the immigrants to Ontario
went to Toronto and 90 percent of the immigrants to British Columbia went to
Vancouver in 1993.[26] Recent immigrants from China to the United States have
gone overwhelmingly to just three states, California, Washington and New York,
and immigrants from Taiwan have gone primarily to California.
Migration from China to these countries is primarily a
migration to the largest urban areas. The distribution of students
from China and Taiwan in the United States is, however, somewhat more
widespread, even if the same general pattern can still be observed.[27]
Apart from the migrations to the main settler societies in
North America and Australasia, there are more minor, but nevertheless notable,
flows from China to other destinations, particularly to Europe. These flows,
quite apart from their size, are somewhat different from those to the major
destinations in terms of their history and their origins. The majority of those
who go to Europe appear to come from the province of Zhejiang, and primarily
from the areas around Wenzhou and Qingtian, and the development of these flows
illustrates very interesting aspects of migration from China. The
British and French recruited nearly 100,000 laborers to fulfill noncombatant
auxiliary or labor duties in France during the First World War.[28] Almost all
of these men were recruited in the Shandong peninsula and transported through
the ports of Weihaiwei and later Qingdao. After 1917, the ships transporting the
laborers put in at Shanghai so that medical examinations could be carried out.
As news of this stop-over spread locally, men from Qingtian were able to mingle
with those from Shanghai and have themselves shipped to France. After the end of
the war, almost all of the men from Shandong were repatriated but some from
Qingtian stayed on. Once they had established themselves, a rise in chain
migration from that area and from the provincial capital Wenzhou
emerged in the mid-1920s, which set up Chinese communities not
only in Paris, but in other continental European cities as well.[29] During the
1920s, perhaps 20,000 people from Qingtian were to be found in European cities,
with Paris, Milan, Berlin, Hamburg, Amsterdam, Rotterdam and Marseilles being
the main communities.[30] Thus, the almost accidental linking of the Qingtian
migrants to the Shandong contract labor system gave rise to a diaspora from
Zhejiang to Europe, yet the larger numbers of migrants from Shandong do not
appear to have generated an equivalent later movement, reflecting the very
different attitudes at the time among Southern and Northern
Chinese towards migration.
Movements to Europe continued with fluctuations from the mid-1920s, and many
migrants returned to China. As with the major destinations of
Chinese migration, the movements to Europe
accelerated again from the late 1970s and in the early 1980s. By the 1990s,
there were probably some 30,000 Chinese in Italy, 150,000 to
200,000 in Paris alone, and 40,000 to 50,000 in the Netherlands.[31] Migrants
from Zhejiang made up 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese in Italy
but, while they figured prominently among those in Paris and the Netherlands
too, the Chinese communities there were much more diverse, with
large numbers from Hong Kong and from Southeast Asian countries.
Contract Labor
The importance of contract labor in the historical development of
Chinese migration is apparent from the discussion
earlier in the article. In the 1990s, contract labor from China continues to
form a significant part of movement overseas. Again, these flows have only
become important since 1979, although there were skilled migrants going to
socialist African countries on contract in the 1970s. Now, China's vast
population is seen by Chinese authorities to be a resource that
can be used to generate foreign exchange.[32] By 1983, there were some 31,000
contract laborers overseas generating some $13 million. Ten years later, the
number of laborers had increased to 173,000, generating over $6.8 billion.[33]
Although there were Chinese laborers working in over one hundred
countries, much of the increase had taken place since 1991, with the initiation
of huge infrastructure projects in Macau and Hong Kong. Over 40,000 laborers
were working in these two areas in 1991,[34] and these numbers have probably
increased substantially since Hong Kong's massive airport and associated
projects have moved into full construction phases. The majority of these
laborers will have been recruited in neighboring Guangdong province although
there are also some from Hunan and as far away as Shandong. Laborers recruited
for projects in Japan, Singapore or the Middle East are likely to have come from
more widespread origins. There also appear to be some 15,000
Chinese workers, mainly from Heilongjiang province, in the Russian
Far East.[35]
Illegal Migration
Illegal flows from China to North America, in particular, have captured the
attention of the media, although these represent, as should be clear from this
article, only part of the total migration from China today Illegal
migration is, nevertheless, an important part of the total flow
but, for obvious reasons, there are no accurate figures on volume and
composition. Official sources from the United States have estimated that perhaps
100,000 people a year in the early 1990s were entering the United States
illegally from China. Chinese sources estimate that, for the same
period, there were up to half a million Chinese waiting for
transit to the West from cities in Russia, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia and
latin America.[36] The majority of these appeared to be heading towards the
United States, although Australian and Western European cities were also among
the preferred destinations. There have also been claims that there may be as
many as one million Chinese living illegally in the Siberian
border regions of Russia's Far East.[37]
The significance of the illegal flow to Western countries lies as much with
the nature of its organization as with sheer numbers. It is clearly linked to
international criminal syndicates and the potential profits are as large as the
punishments are derisory in the case of capture. The resurgence of crime in
China has been an unfortunate outgrowth of reforms. Some of the new rich have
been able to suborn local and regional government officials to further their own
ends, and corrupt cadres, often at senior levels, have not been immune from
direct participation in this activity. One lucrative activity is the smuggling
of people who otherwise would not be able to negotiate successfully the long
process to secure legal documents to emigrate. Individuals are reputedly charged
between $30,000 and $50,000 to be smuggled into the United States. Clearly few
have these kinds of resources and the syndicates accept an initial advance
payment of around 10 percent and a slightly larger payment at an intermediate
the balance must be paid upon reaching the destination.[38] Many are kept
as virtual slave laborers in the Chinatowns of New York and San Francisco until
their debts are paid off. This system is reminiscent of the credit-ticket system
of the last century and, again, most of the migrants are young males, even if
there are also significant numbers of young women, both of whom presumably wish
to return either to their families or to marry once they have made their
fortunes in the New World. They are the new sojourners, although many tragically
become trapped by criminal networks. Prostitution and drug smuggling are ways of
repaying enormous debts into which the migrants have fallen in their wish to
leave China.
The majority of illegal migrants come from Southern China, again fitting into
traditional networks, with most coming from a small number of towns in coastal
Fujian province, particularly in Changle County While the numbers arriving off
the coast of the United States, such as those aboard the Golden Venture, capture
the spotlight, it is likely that the majority of illegals leave by plane for
Central American destinations via continental Europe for onward movement by land
or small plane.
There are also considerable illegal flows to Asian destinations. Apart from
the booming ports in the Russian Far East and their network of criminal
activities, there are continuous flows to Hong Kong, with around 38,000 being
captured and repatriated during 1993 and again in 1994, and also to Taiwan,
Japan and Thailand, although information on these flows is fragmentary The money
that can be earned from smuggling people both regionally and across the Pacific
and the linkages to global networks of international crime mean that illegal
migration from China is likely to continue as a major problem for
destination countries in the years ahead, and as an important element in the
activities of multinational criminal corporations.
Discussion
The migration out of China that was truncated from the late
nineteenth century through to the 1930s, depending on the destination, laid the
basis for the present patterns of population movement. These began from Hong
Kong and Taiwan from the 1950s and continued with changed
immigration laws in the main potential destination areas from the
1960s. An acceleration has occurred since the opening up of China itself from
1979. It is, nevertheless, still difficult to leave China. There is still no
real freedom of movement despite the increased numbers of migrants. Many who
cannot obtain a passport and an exit visa attemp although
this option is expensive and can be dangerous. The numbers going legally and
illegally are small relative to the size of China's population. Those leaving
are still primarily from the provinces of Southern China, although there are
signs that the migration fields are being extended further north,
often pioneered by students from the main university centers. The vast majority
of China's population is as yet untouched by international
migration, either directly or indirectly, although given the
upsurge in domestic movements since the early 1980s this cannot be said about
internal migration. Though the consequences of
migration are varied: whether rising aspirations brought about
through the increasing numbers moving to towns and cities, even temporarily,
will impel whether the student migrations
that have led to settlement will later generate chain movements through family
or whether the new sojourner migrations will give
rise to more permanent settlement and later chain migration will
all depend upon policies not only in destination societies, but primarily in the
direction taken in post-Deng China. A steady continuation of current policies is
likely to see a gradual acceleration of migration from China. A
reversion to policies of the extreme left is likely to see an exodus of the new
middle classes from the coastal cities to Hong Kong, Taiwan and other parts of
Asia, which would have profound consequences for most parts of the world.
Such idle speculation on hypothetical future directions diverts attention
from the essential fact that migration is not just about numbers,
but about control over wealth and ideas. Although the numbers of migrants from
China are relatively small compared with the great migrations out
of Europe from a much smaller base population earlier this century, the
composition of the migrant flows has been heavily biased towards the
postgraduate-level student, the professionals and the wealthier groups. Many of
these wealthier groups are from the peripheral areas of Hong Kong and Taiwan,
but they often maintain close links with their home areas in China, commuting
regularly to them, and they have business interests there and among the wider
networks of the overseas Chinese. Many of the students are indeed
from China and their return, if it occurs, like the return of previous
generations of students, is likely to have a major impact on the home society.
Although the numbers of migrants from China are relatively small, their
potential impact on origin and destination areas can be great. The emigration is
still primarily from areas with the longest contact with the outside world,
emphasizing the historical legacy and continuities with the past, while the
increasing complexity of emigration both reflects and reinforces the recent
development of Southern China and the large coastal cities.
Migration from China demonstrates continuities in spatial pattern
and in certain types of migrants such as the new sojourners, both rich and poor.
There are nevertheless important differences from past patterns in terms of
wider participation from regions of origin and n terms of a greater range of
migrant types as highly educated men and women, as well as poorer people,
participate in population flows integrating China more fully into the world
system. Whatever the future direction of political and economic change in China,
population migration in and out of China is going to be a profound
force for change around the Pacific Rim, elsewhere in the world, and in China
itself as we move into the twenty first century.
* I wish to thank my colleague Professor Ron Hill for his comments on parts
of this paper and Dr. George Lin of the University of Hong Kong and Dr. Chan Kam
Wing of the University of Washington for supplying information. Needless to say
they cannot be held responsible for the interpretations made in the paper.
1 A.H. Smith cited in Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast
Asia (London: Oxford University Press, 1965, 2nd ed.) p. 30. The Confucian ideal
of the sedentary nature of Chinese life is outlined in
Y.C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966) p. 23. See
also Rance Lee, "The Fading of Earthbound Compulsion in a Chinese
Village: Population Mobility and Its Economic Implication," in Social Life and
Development in Hong Kong, eds. Ambrose King and Rance Lee (Hong Kong: The
Chinese University Press, 1981).
2 C.P. FitzGerald, The Southern Expansion of the Chinese
People: Southern Fields and Southern Ocean (London: Barrie and Jenkins, 1972).
3 Sterling Seagrave, Lords of the Rim: The Invisible Empire of the Overseas
Chinese (London: Bantam Press, 1995). Another good general
introduction to the Chinese diaspora is Lynn Pan, Sons of the
Yellow Emperor: The Story of the Overseas Chinese (London:
Seckerand Warburg, 1990).
4 Elizabeth Sinn, "Emigration from Hong Kong before 1941: General Trends," in
Emigration froth Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts, ed. Ronald Skeldon (Hong
Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995) p. 12.
5 The laws prohibiting emigration were not formally rescinded until 1893. The
Qing and Ming attitudes towards emigration are summarized in Harley MacNair, The
Chineseabroad: Their Position and Protection (Shanghai: The Commercial Press,
1933). See also Purcell, chapter 3.
6 Robert Irick, Ch'ingPolicy Toward the Coolie Trade,
Chinese Materials Center, 1982).
7 See Elizabeth Sinn, "Emigration from Hong Kong Before 1941: Organization
and Impact," in Emigration from Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts, ed. Ronald
Skeldon (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1995).
8 The contrast between sojourners and settlers, often in the context of
comparing Asian, mainly Chinese, movements with European
migration, can be overdrawn. Many Europeans were also sojourners
and returned relatively quickly to their home countries. For an incisive
discussion, see Chan Sucheng, "European and Asian Immigration Into
the United States in Comparative Perspective," in Immigration
Reconsidered: History, Society, and Policies, ed. Virginia Yans-McLaughlin (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990).
9 For estimates of the numbers of Chinese overseas at this time
in Southeast Asia, see P for the United States, see Harry H.L. Kitano and
Roger Daniels, Asian Americans: Emerging Minorities (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice
Hall, 1988); and for Canada, see Edgar Wickberg, ed., From China to Canada: A
History of the Chinese Communities in Canada (Toronto: McClelland
and Stewart, 1982).
10 Pan, p. 18.
11 Sinn, p. 12.
12 The best account of these policies remains Charles Price, The Great White
Walls Are Built: Restrictive Immigration to North America and
Australasia
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1974).
13 See james Warren, Rickshaw Coolie: A People's History of Singapore
() (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1986). See also Ron Hill,
"Notes on Chinese Agricultural Colonization in Southeast Asia"
Erdkunde, 42 (1988) pp. 123-35.
14 David Podmore, "The Population of Hong Kong," in Hong Kong: The Industrial
Colony, ed. Keith Hopkins (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1971).
15 An overview of migration to Hong Kong up to the early 1980's
is given in Ronald Skeldon, "Hong Kong and its Hinterland: A Case of
International Rural-to-Urban Migration?" Asian Geographer, 5, no.
I (1986) pp. 1-24.
16 The issue of emigration from Hong Kong is discussed fully in Ronald
Skeldon, "Hong Kong in an International Migration System," in
Reluctant Exiles? Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas
Chinese (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994).
17 Immigration Statistics, (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 1992).
18 Information on students in the United States comes from the biannual Open
Doors: Report on International Educational Exchange (New York: Institute of
International Education).
19 Sugimoto, "Mass Migration", p. 26.
20 See Ronald Skeldon, "International Migration Within and From
the East and Southeast Asian Region: A Review Essay," Asian and Pacific
Migration Journal, 1, no. I (1992) pp. 19-63.
21 Cited in Migration News (Davis: University of California,
May 1995).
22 See Chong-Pin Lin, "China's Students Abroad: Rates of Return," The
American Enterprise, 5, no. 6 (1994) pp. 12-14.
23 Kee Pookong and Ronald Skeldon, "The Migration and
Settlement of Hong Kong Chinese in Australia," in Reluctant
Exiles? Migration from Hong Kong and the New Overseas
Chinese, ed. Ronald Skeldon (New York: ME. Sharpe, 1994); and
Ronald Skeldon, "The Chinese in Pacific Rim Development," in
Global-Local Relations in Pacific Rim Development, eds. Peter Rimmet and Sophie
Watson (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, forthcoming).
24 Wang I-chu, Chinese Intellectuals and the West,
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966).
25 Miao Jian Hua, "International Migration in China: A Survey
of Emigrants from Shanghai," Asian and Pacific Migration Journal,
3, no. 2-3 (1994) pp. 445-63.
26 Diana Lary, "Regional Variations in Settlement of Hong Kong Immigrants,"
Canada and HongKong Update, no. 12 (Spring 1994) pp. 5-6.
27 Maps on distributions are provided in Open Doors : Report on
International Educational Exchange (New York: Institute of International
Education, 1994).
28 The fullest account of this incident is given in Michael Summerskill,
China on the Western Front (London: Michael Summerskill, 1982).
29 Charles Archaimbault, "En Marge du Quartier Chinois de Paris," Bulletin de
la Societe des Etudes Ilndochinoises, 27, no. 3 (1952) pp. 275-94.
30 From Chinese sources cited in Metre Thuno, "Diversity and
Diffusion: The Chinese Community in Denmark,"paper presented at
the Conference on The Last Half Century of Chinese Overseas:
Comparative Perspectives (The University of Hong Kong, 19-21 December 1994).
31 The figures for Italy come from Aliza Wong, "II Quartiere
Chinese: The Emerging Chinese Community in Milan,
Italy," paper presented at the Conference on the Last Half Century of
Chinese Overseas: Comparative Perspectives (The University of Hong
Kong, 19-21 December 1994); the figures for Paris from Yu-Sion Live "Les Chinois
de Paris Depuis le Debut du Siecle: Presence Urbaine et Activites Economiques,"
Revue Eurapeenne des Migrations Internationales, 8, no. 3 (1992)
pp. 155-173; and for the Netherlands from Frank Pieke,
"Immigration et Entreprenariat: Les Chinois aux Pays-Bas," Revue
Europeenne des Migrations Internationales, 8, no. 3 (1992) pp.
32 Fang Shah, "Mainland China's Overseas Construction Contracts and Export of
Labour," Issues and Studies, 27, no. 2 (1991) pp. 65-75.
33 Figures from the China Yearbook of Foreign Relations and Trade (Beijing).
34 Zhang Jixun, "The Chinese Labour Export Market," paper
presented at the Conference on Migration and the Labour Market in
Asia in the Year 2000, OECD and Japan Institute of Labour (Tokyo: 19-20 January
35 Hiroshi Kakazu, "Northeast Asian Regional Economic Cooperation," in Growth
Triangles in Asia: A New Approach to Regional Economic Cooperation, eds. Myo
Thant, Min Tang and Hiroshi Kakazu (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994).
36 Chinese sources cited in Migration News
(Davis: University of California, November 1994); see also Willard Myers,
"Statement to the Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations and Human Rights, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of
Representatives, November 4, 1993," The Center for the Study of Asian Organized
Crime (Philadelphia).
37 Asia Yearbook 1994 (Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review) p. 199.
38 The organization of illegal migration is given fuller
treatment in Ronald Skeldon, "East Asian Migration and the
Changing World Order," in Population Migration and the Changing
World Order, eds. William Gould and Allan Findlay (London: Wiley, 1994).
Table 1. Chinese Settler Migration to the
Three Main Overseas Destination Countries, 1982-94
United States 1982-87
Sources: United States: United States Department of Justice, Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service:
(Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, various years).
Immigrants admitted under IRCA legalization have been omitted from the figures
in this table.
Canada: Immigration Statistics, Ottawa, (Canada: Employment and
Immigration, various years).
Australia: Bureau of Immigration. Australian
Immigration: Consolidated Statistics No. 18. 1993-94, (Canberra:
Multicultural and Population Research, Australian Government Publishing Service.
Note: Canada compiles its immigration dat
the United States and Australia employ fiscal or financial years which are from
different mid-year dates for the different countries.
By Ronald Skeldon[*]
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Source: Journal of International Affairs, Winter96, Vol. 49 Issue 2,
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